Iran After Khamenei

Originally published in the Boston Review on March 3, 2026.

An interview with sociologist Asef Bayat on the U.S.-Israeli war, democratic opposition to the Islamic Republic, and the country’s uncertain future.

On Saturday Israel and the United States abruptly launched a large-scale war against Iran—the second unprovoked attack by U.S.-Israeli forces in less than a year—in the middle of diplomatic negotiations in Geneva. As of this writing, more than 550 Iranians have been killed, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, members of his family, several other senior Iranian leaders, and scores of civilians.

The war comes as Iranians are still reeling from their own government’s crackdown on mass protests in early January, when hundreds of thousands took to the streets across the country in what is known as the Dey 1404 uprising, referring to its date in the Iranian calendar. Islamic Republic security forces responded brutally, killing thousands in the worst mass slaughter of protesters in Iranian history and detaining and injuring tens of thousands more. Iranians had just finished marking a traditional chehelom or fortieth-day memorial of protesters’ deaths with angry, mournful marches a week before Israeli and U.S. bombs began to fall.

To put the war and recent protests in context, I spoke with Iranian American sociologist Asef Bayat, a distinguished scholar of Middle Eastern society and social movements. Among his many books, a trilogy of studies—Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Can Change the Middle East (2013), Revolutions without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring (2017), and Revolutionary Life: The Everyday of the Arab Spring (2021)—examines how ordinary people have been agents of political change in Iran and across the region as well as how militarization reshapes grassroots struggles for liberation.

In an email exchange, we discussed the sources and significance of the Dey protests, the broader history of Iranian opposition to the Islamic Republic, the impact of foreign intervention and diaspora voices on the current political landscape, and possibilities for a democratic transition.

—Alex Shams

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Alex Shams: You have written extensively on sociopolitical transformations in the Middle East in recent decades, including the Arab Spring revolutions that led to the toppling of several long-standing Arab dictators. We have now witnessed the demise of another long-ruling leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. How do the recent mass protests against the Islamic Republic and now the U.S.-Israeli war—waged partly in the name of giving the Iranian people their “hour” of “freedom”—fit into the broader patterns of regional change you have studied?

Asef Bayat: For decades, the Middle East has been marked by entrenched authoritarian regimes that have subjugated the majority of their populations. If there is anything “exceptional” about the region, it may be the particular convergence of oil, Israel, and Islamism—a unique combination that has significantly contributed to authoritarian resilience. In Iran and most Arab countries, for instance, open and organized dissent—along with the free expression of demands by workers, women, students, and other social groups—is severely restricted due to repression. As a result, citizens often resort to what I have called “non-movements”: forms of everyday resistance through which ordinary people quietly and directly claim housing, employment, rights, and dignity, while remaining alert to opportunities for more organized collective action when political space opens up. These daily struggles, often invisible to officials and observers, can gradually accumulate and intensify to the point where open confrontation with the state becomes unavoidable. An important example is Iranian women’s persistent everyday resistance—particularly their struggle over compulsory hijab—which eventually culminated in the “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising in September 2022.

“Neither Israel nor the United States genuinely cares about the Iranian people’s struggle for a free and democratic future.”

Over the past decade, new developments in the political economy of these countries created fresh opportunities for mobilization, which ultimately found expression in the Arab Spring revolutions. First is staggering inequality and exclusion, resulting largely from neoliberal economic policies pursued by ruling regimes. Second is a large constituency of educated and aware citizens who nonetheless felt economically marginalized and socially devalued. The central force here has been what I call the “middle-class poor”: a contradictory social group with middle-class aspirations and expectations but living under precarious, often impoverished conditions. Third—and critically—the rise of digital technologies and social media enabled new forms of connective action, making mobilization faster, less costly, and more decentralized. Together these dynamics produced the wave of remarkable uprisings across ten Arab countries, and later in Iran.

However, these rapid and widespread mobilizations largely lacked coherent organization, identifiable and accountable leadership, and a clearly articulated vision of the kind of political order they wanted to establish. In other words, while the uprisings were spectacular in their scale and energy, they did not constitute a structured and organized alternative to the incumbents. They succeeded in toppling dictators, but they did not take power.

In this sense, they did not produce revolutions in the twentieth-century sense, but rather the fear of revolution—prompting already organized forces, such as the military or entrenched regime institutions, to step in, fill the vacuum of power, and shape the political outcome. In the Arab world, these forces were largely domestic. In Iran, however, the forces poised to shape such an outcome now appear to be foreign.

Like the Arab Spring uprisings, the Women, Life, Freedom movement in Iran was remarkable in its scale of mobilization, the radical nature of its demands, and its emphasis on women’s rights and reclaiming life. Yet organizationally and strategically, it too failed to present a tangible and workable alternative to the ruling system. The movement did generate significant changes in social norms and cultural values. For example, it effectively established “hijab by choice” as a lived reality in many public spaces. However, it produced little transformation at the level of state power. Clerical rule remained intact, while deepening economic, social, and environmental crises persisted. So, when the Dey 1404 uprising was met with the massacre of thousands of protesters, many Iranians came to believe that repeated cycles of domestic uprisings alone were insufficient to transform the system. For some, this led to the conclusion that only foreign military intervention could ultimately topple the regime.

With the unprovoked war launched by Israel and the United States—an illegal exercise of force that must be condemned in the strongest possible terms—we have now reached a new and dangerous stage. But regardless of the legitimacy or morality of these attacks, some argue that there are moments in history when the interests of imperial powers may temporarily converge with those of a discontented population. In the balance of such converging of interests, which party ultimately holds the power to shape the outcome of change? If the United States and Israel become the decisive actors in Iran’s political future, what will that mean for the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, natural resources, political order, and the well-being of its people?

External powers pursue their own strategic and geopolitical objectives, and these are likely, sooner or later, to conflict with the aspirations of a genuinely democratic Iran. For this reason, it is imperative that Iranians organize themselves into independent civil and political collectives and movements committed to democracy, human rights, and social justice. Only through autonomous and organized civic agency can they safeguard their own future—and the future of their country—amid profound and uncertain transformation.

Shams: Many people danced in the streets of cities and towns across Iran when they heard the news of Khamenei’s death. What do you make of this public rejoicing at this moment? How might we understand it in relation to earlier revolutionary moments in Iran’s history or in comparison with other countries? Are we witnessing another revolutionary movement?

Bayat: Yes, I have seen dozens of videos from across Iran as well as from the diaspora showing how many Iranians reacted with visible joy to the Ayatollah’s demise. There were scenes of women screaming, laughing, and crying in what can only be described as cathartic release. These reactions reveal the depth of resentment and anger that Ayatollah Khamenei and his system have generated among large segments of the population. Since 1989, Khamenei ruled Iran with an iron hand as a supreme leader accountable to no one. He rarely subjected himself to open questioning and never allowed independent journalists to challenge him about policy failures or contradictory statements. He governed as though he personally embodied the state. His ideological rigidity, combined with what many saw as grandiose illusions about building a powerful regional bloc to rival the West, imposed immense political, economic, and social costs on the country and its people. In this context, the public outpouring of resentment was hardly surprising.

At the same time, alongside the celebrations, we also witnessed large crowds of mourners filling the streets, grieving the death of their leader. Even if they represent a visible minority, they are nonetheless part of the nation and will remain so. This striking polarization must be carefully managed in any democratic transition. Building consensus and cultivating trust across deeply divided constituencies will be one of the most difficult and urgent tasks facing those who aspire to transformative change.

But does what we are witnessing amount to a “national revolution,” as some have claimed? I would hesitate to use that term. The recent Dey uprising and the developments that followed are better understood not as a revolution but as a signpost along a revolutionary course—one that reveals the many obstacles, detours, and uncertainties on the road to meaningful transformation. We know that revolutions are rarely purely national phenomena; they are shaped by international forces that often intervene in, and sometimes determine, their outcomes. Iran now finds itself at precisely such a juncture. Recognizing and navigating these external pressures will be a central challenge for those who seek to bring about substantive change to reclaim life, liberty, and dignity for the country.

Shams: What were the main factors that sparked the uprising? How were the recent protests similar to or different from previous waves, particularly that of 2022?

Bayat: The recent wave was not unprecedented. Over the past two decades, the Islamic Republic has faced several large-scale uprisings, including those in 2009, 2017, 2019, 2022, and now again today. In many cases, one might expect an unpopular regime to offer concessions or pursue reforms to prevent collapse. However, under Ayatollah Khamenei, the regime has consistently refused to do so, largely out of fear that any political concessions would embolden the opposition to demand even more.

The latest wave was triggered by economic issues—a sharp currency devaluation and a broader economic downturn. But the core issue is political. The Islamic Republic is a deeply repressive, corrupt, and incompetent regime grappling with multiple structural crises: energy shortages, decaying infrastructure, environmental degradation, inflation, and a broader economic decline. While U.S.-imposed sanctions have certainly exacerbated these problems, the crisis runs much deeper. At its core, the crisis reflects a chronic governance failure rooted in systemic corruption, which prioritizes ideological commitment and political loyalty over competence. For most people, this systemic failure manifests as daily repression, discrimination, and a pervasive sense of existential insecurity—leading to periodic social explosions like the recent protests.

The recent cycle was the latest in a series of nationwide uprisings over the past decade, but it differed from previous ones in five key ways.

“Does what we are witnessing amount to a ‘national revolution’? I would hesitate to use that term.”

First, it was triggered by protests from a segment of bazaar merchants in Tehran, who were hit hard by the sharp drop in the value of the Iranian currency. Shopkeepers found themselves unable to price their goods, effectively making trade impossible. This protest was unprecedented in the history of the Islamic Republic, especially given the traditionally close relationship between the bazaari and the clerical class. Second, the protests were cross-class in nature. They included not only the globalized rich, whose business interests and lifestyles clashed with the clerical regime’s ideology and economic policies, but also the poor, whose daily struggle to maintain a dignified life is hindered by the regime’s rigid policies that prioritize grand military and nuclear sectors over the welfare of its subaltern citizens. According to the Tehran-based daily Shargh, the purchasing power of working-class Iranians today is only a third of what it was ten years ago. Third, although precise figures are unavailable, eyewitness accounts confirm that the size of the crowds this time surpassed any previous protests. Fourth, while the protests were initially sparked by economic concerns, their focus quickly shifted to calls for the overthrow of the regime itself.

And finally, the mood of this uprising was influenced by last year’s twelve-day conflict with Israel, which fueled the belief that a targeted foreign (particularly U.S.) strike could decapitate the regime and potentially open a new political horizon for Iran. This idea has gained traction among a significant portion of the population and is actively promoted by the monarchist movement, led by Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the Shah deposed in 1979. Pahlavi has now gained unprecedented support and has become the dominant force within the opposition for the first time. However, unlike the Women, Life, Freedom movement, which had broad support across ethnic groups, this uprising saw more limited participation from diverse communities such as Kurds, Baluchis, Azeris, and Arabs. These groups largely stayed away, perceiving the protests as dominated by monarchist factions.

Shams: Pahlavi has certainly gained unprecedented visibility in recent months. “Long Live the Shah” slogans have been heard in Iran as well as in the diaspora, and his supporters claim he is the most widely backed figure, representing a “unity” candidate. What do you make of these claims? How do Pahlavi and the “Make Iran Great Again” movement fit into the broader panorama of far-right groups worldwide?

Bayat: There’s no doubt that, for the first time, the monarchist faction has become a dominant opposition force. Over the past decade, with substantial financial and logistical backing—especially through two TV channels—there has been a concerted effort to paint a restoration of the Pahlavi era as a viable alternative to the current regime. Pahlavi has become a recognizable figure with a clear project at a time when many Iranians are desperately searching for a tangible alternative. He has forged connections with U.S. officials as well as Netanyahu’s government. And Israel’s government has in return provided significant media support, often inflating the popularity of the monarchist project.

As this momentum built, the deeply divided left, liberals, democrats, and republicans didn’t take Pahlavi seriously. They failed, at the same time, to unite around a democratic project and to pay adequate attention to the efforts of such figures as former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who had been striving to create a movement for democratic transition. In the end, the monarchists rose to fill the vacuum.

“In a sense, we have witnessed the ‘Syrianization of Iran,’ not in terms of civil conflict (though it remains a risk) but in the brutality of governance.”

But Pahlavi’s dominance is as much a strength as a drawback. Far from “uniting” the diverse opposition, his rise has deepened divisions. Lacking a political structure inside Iran and refusing to build coalitions with other opposition groups such as the left and republicans, Pahlavi has relied almost entirely on foreign support—particularly from the United States and Israel. While many Iranians may support foreign intervention out of desperation, there are significant factions who oppose military involvement as well as the monarchist project, given the devastating aftermath of U.S. interventions in Iraq, Syria, and Libya.

As a result, the opposition remains deeply fragmented. Many constituencies—including liberals, democrats, leftists, women’s groups, and marginalized communities such as Kurds, Azeris, Baluchis, and those in southern Khuzestan—do not align with Pahlavi. Their opposition stems from fears of a return to autocratic monarchy and concerns about his perceived dependence on the United States and Israel. Those committed to democratic governance often doubt the monarchists’ ability or willingness to replace the current repressive regime with a truly democratic political order.

Still, a sense of desperation has created a constituency that simply wants to dismantle the current system, regardless of what replaces it. For years Iranians have shown extraordinary courage and sacrifice, demanding the regime offer even a small amount of democracy and justice. But the regime has refused to move even an inch. Now many Iranians are asking, what else can we do to rid ourselves of this unjust system? A growing number believe that Pahlavi and even U.S. military intervention could create a political breakthrough. Many feel that whatever comes will be better than this regime.

The monarchists have capitalized on this sentiment, operating without being burdened by what political scientist Daniel Ritter calls the “iron cage of liberalism.” The global rise of anti-democracy movements has made it easier for them to embrace their authoritarian ethos. Unlike the deposed Shah, who had to pay lip service to human rights and democracy in order to fit into the liberal global order, today’s monarchists and their international allies not only ignore these values but attack those calling for republicanism, democracy, and human rights.

Shams: To return to the Dey protests before the U.S.-Israeli strikes, Iranian authorities have claimed that hundreds of the dead are security forces who were killed by armed protesters. Reports have surfaced of armed individuals among the protesters and confrontations from both sides. Some Israeli and U.S. politicians have suggested Mossad’s involvement. What do you make of these claims? Is there evidence that Iranians are being trained by outside actors? Is armed resistance justified, and could it be successful? How do we understand armed revolt in this context?

Bayat: Yes, the Iranian government has also claimed that hundreds of mosques, banks, and other government buildings were set on fire by “terrorists,” “Mossad agents,” and other foreign-backed operatives. While it’s hard to verify the extent of these claims, it’s important to note that in almost every previous uprising, the authorities have blamed “foreign agents” for stirring unrest.

It’s possible that some foreign-backed groups were involved in violent acts, but the scale of the protests—across 400 cities and 900 locations—was too large for such actors to be the central force. Some critics in Iran, including former security officials, believe that at least some of these arson attacks, such as those targeting mosques, may have been carried out by security forces themselves in an effort to provoke religious backlash against the protesters. Similar tactics were used during the Green Movement in 2009 when bombs were placed in the shrine of Ayatollah Khomeini, an operation that former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—also reportedly killed by this weekend’s strikes—later suggested was orchestrated by Iranian intelligence.

That said, it’s also plausible that some protesters, particularly those who see mosques not as places of worship but as centers of repression, might have resorted to violence, like setting a mosque on fire. Radical acts were especially reported in poorer neighborhoods. As one witness put it, demonstrations took place in 100 areas of Tehran, but neighborhoods like Naziabad saw the most intense confrontations.

The sense of abandonment, humiliation, and oppression among the marginalized can, understandably, translate into acts of revenge when opportunities arise. I can empathize with the resentment of those who have endured decades of humiliation and insecurity under a despotic rule. But I also wonder how strategic this radicalism is in achieving the goal of liberation from a system that shows little moral hesitation in committing mass killings. In these situations, the role of leadership becomes critical. Leaders must offer wisdom and guide the movement toward the best course of action, one that minimizes costs and maximizes chances of success.

 

Shams: The official death toll, according to the government of Iran, is around 3,000, though opposition figures claim the actual number could be several times that. How does this scale of violence compare to past instances of political repression in Iran? And how do you think it will impact society?

Bayat: An Iranian human rights group based in Washington, D.C., has reported more than 7,000 deaths and 53,000 detentions. Clearly, the death toll—and the horrifying images of body bags in hospitals, morgues, and trucks—are shocking. This points to a systematic campaign of violence by the security forces and Basij militias, who reportedly used axes and machetes as well as weapons of war, including snipers stationed on top of mosques, hospitals, and police stations.

“Reza Pahlavi’s dominance is as much a strength as a drawback. Far from ‘uniting’ the diverse opposition, his rise has deepened divisions.”

The regime has committed mass killings before, particularly during the years just before the end of the Iran-Iraq War, when thousands of prisoners, mostly from the Mujahedin Khalq and leftist organizations, were reportedly executed. However, the recent mass killing of civilians over just two nights is something entirely different. Reports indicate that the majority of the victims are young, from small towns, and from lower-income families.

This has created a national trauma, the effects of which are likely to be felt for a long time. Iranians are calling this a “red line” that has been crossed, and many believe that the relationship between the people and the regime will never be repaired. And yet the regime probably justifies it on the ideological principle of protecting the Islamic state as the first and most important obligation (owjab Wajibat).

Shams: For the last fifteen years, Khamenei had repeatedly claimed that his goal was to prevent Iran from becoming like war-torn Syria, arguing that this was the goal of the United States and Israel. A few years ago, jailed opposition figure Mostafa Tajzadeh responded by saying, “We were worried about Iran becoming war-torn like Syria. It didn’t. But the Ba’ath Party became the model for our ruling system.” What do you make of these dueling claims about the “Syrianization” of Iran and the broader specter of civil conflict?

Bayat: It’s true that both U.S. and Israeli policies have aimed to neutralize Iran—whether by curbing its growing regional influence or halting its nuclear ambitions. Israel, in particular, would want to see a weak and even a divided Iran. And neither of these countries genuinely cares about the Iranian people’s struggle for a free and democratic future. In fact, they’d likely prefer a despotic regime in Iran, as long as they can manipulate it to their advantage. Although Donald Trump and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have claimed the objective of U.S.-Israeli strikes is to “obliterate” Iran’s nuclear program, destroy its missile system, and “annihilate” its navy, the larger purpose remains unclear. If regime change is the goal, how exactly is that supposed to unfold?

As for Khamenei’s claim about preventing Iran from becoming like Syria, it has always been a way to discredit democratic opposition. When the Arab Spring revolutions unfolded in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Bahrain, Khamenei touted the “Islamic renaissance” as a force unseating dictators even as he suppressed his own opposition. And when the Syrian revolution rose against Bashar al-Assad’s tyranny, the Iranian regime and its allies crushed it, pushing Syria into a devastating civil war, especially after the United States and other regional powers got involved. Tajzadeh has a point. In some ways clerical rule in Iran has become similar to the Ba’athist regime in its surveillance and repression of democratic opposition—something we saw in the recent uprising. In a sense, we have witnessed the “Syrianization of Iran,” not in terms of civil conflict but in the brutality of governance.

Yet this very brutality, combined with U.S. and Israeli involvement, does risk sparking civil conflict. The government’s violent suppression has frustrated many attempts to bring about meaningful change, and as a result, many Iranians are now desperate for any means of dismantling the regime—even if it means welcoming a foreign military intervention.

Shams: As you said, the recent protests began in response to sudden currency devaluation, rising inflation, and worsening living conditions for ordinary people. We saw unions, workers’ groups, and student organizations releasing statements in support of the protests. What is the state of the left in Iran right now? How did it participate in the uprising? How does it view political transition today, and can it offer a viable alternative?

Bayat: From my understanding, civil society organizations—including unions and workers’ groups—were much more involved in the Women, Life, Freedom movement than in the recent uprising. The recent protests had an overwhelmingly political focus with sectoral demands like workers’ rights taking a back seat to the collective call to dismantle the Islamic Republic. Because of strict surveillance, the left in Iran operates more as a loose network comprising student groups, workers, teachers, academics, women’s activists, and environmentalists, with only the Kurdish region having a longstanding tradition of leftist organizations that continue to operate at the regional level.

During the recent Dey protests, leftists appeared to participate more as individuals than as organized groups. Many leftist organizations in the diaspora—remnants of groups formed right after the 1979 revolution such as the Fedaian Khalq or the communist Tudeh Party—are mostly political in nature and have little connection to the grassroots inside Iran. Most of these organizations tend to resemble more of a political lifestyle or identity rather than an active, grassroots movement. Given their deep divisions, I’m skeptical that they can offer a viable political alternative under current circumstances.

Broadly speaking, however, the left today remains a party to the “third way” that opposes both the regime and the monarchist current, along with its international supporters. Iran’s leftists are also frustrated with the Western left, which they believe mischaracterizes the Islamic Republic as “anti-imperialist” and overlooks the real struggles of ordinary Iranians who are fighting for dignity and democracy. Recently, an activist lawyer from Iran expressed outrage at how the U.S. left has ignored the plight of the Iranian poor. “Oh, Iranian workers and toilers as your tormented bodies bleed on the cold cement of the streets,” she said, “know that the global left and its leaders—like Judith Butler, Žižek, and others—didn’t see your body bags worthy of tears, as those in Gaza.” This is a subject that needs a serious conversation.

Shams: Many supporters of foreign intervention argue that meaningful change cannot come from within Iran. How do you respond to this? Is change possible from within Iranian society? Where do you see reasons for hope?

Bayat: This is a real concern and a critical question. The truth is, the Islamic Republic is not authoritarian in the same way as the Shah’s regime was before the revolution. It is more like the ideological communist governments. It is an ideological rule born of the 1979 revolution, and it has built parallel institutions alongside those inherited from the pre-revolutionary state.

These institutions form a powerful “deep state” operating under the authority of the supreme leader, who is not accountable to elected bodies like the presidency or parliament—though those bodies themselves are subject to strict vetting and oversight. Over time, the regime has created its own “people,” a kind of regime class—a minority composed mostly of the families of Revolutionary Guard members, Basij vigilantes, state functionaries, and operators of countless organizations, mosques, shrines, and foundations. These groups benefit politically and economically in exchange for their loyalty to the system. As a result, they are likely to defend the regime—potentially with force—against widespread opposition. However, historical examples of ideological regimes, particularly in Eastern Europe, show that such systems often “age,” lose legitimacy, become expired, so to speak, and eventually shift course through partial liberalization before collapsing. A sustained and powerful mass opposition could accelerate this long process.

“It’s crucial to link the many dispersed groups of democracy-seekers, both inside and outside Iran, in something like a democratic front.”

There is another possibility, however: a lower-cost democratic transition through a “negotiated revolution,” which I have written about elsewhere. It would involve several key components. First, it requires the continuation of popular struggles and resistance within civil society. This includes supporting non-movements, organizing collectives, groups, associations, and social movements, all of which will keep society politically active, vibrant, and engaged. Second, it involves an intellectual and discursive campaign built around the project of transitioning to a democratic order. This includes advocating for a referendum and the establishment of a constituent assembly to determine the country’s future political structure. This vision is championed by Iran’s gozar-talabaan (transitionalists), led by Mousavi, the former prime minister currently under house arrest. In parallel, it’s crucial to build and connect organizations, linking the many dispersed circles and groups of democracy-seekers both inside and outside Iran in something like a democratic front. Finally, pressure must be applied to the crisis-stricken regime to negotiate the transition process.

What I’ve outlined here is just a broad strategy that needs elaboration—identifying obstacles and finding practical solutions. But let me address one common question. People often ask why a government would engage in negotiations that could lead to its own demise. It’s a fair question: no regime would willingly cede power, unless it is forced to. The rulers of apartheid South Africa, communist Poland, or Pinochet’s Chile didn’t want to give up power either, but they eventually had no choice. A negotiated revolution means preparing for such a moment—a moment that starts with intellectual groundwork, establishing a meaningful and broadly shared discourse around democratic transition, and culminating in mass uprisings when the established system begins to crumble.

As of this moment, Iran is not there yet. But it remains a vision we should take seriously.